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On Contractual Defaults and Experimental Law 
and Economics 
Comment 
by 
Avishalom Tor* 
Experimental methodologies generally and experimental economics specifically 
have the advantage of providing controlled tests of hypotheses regarding the re- 
lationship among variables of legal relevance (Camerer and Talley [2005], 
Tor [2007]). In fact, experimental law and economics ("ELE") - which uses the 
methodology of experimental economics - has already made significant contribu- 
tions to legal scholarship. The application of any methodology without awareness 
of its inherent limitations, however, may well diminish its validity, and ELE is 
no exception. This comment on Sloof, Oosterbeek, and Sonnemans' [2007] 
("SOS") interesting and clear experiment1 will emphasize both ELE's potential and 
its limitations. 
SOS examined the impact of contractual defaults in a bilateral game, with full 
information a d monetary incentives for performance. Participants were paired, 
one ("Proposer") proposing a contract of his choice - either the default or one of 
three other contracts - and the other ("Respondent") deciding whether to accept the 
proposal. When the default contract was proposed, as well as whenever Respondent 
rejected the proposal, the default contract applied. SOS found participants neither 
more likely to propose nor more likely to accept the default contract, compared to 
the alternative contracts. They therefore concluded that default remedies had little 
to no effect on participants' choice of contract ("the No Bias Finding"). 
The No Bias Finding fits the rational choice prediction that contract default rules 
will not be "sticky." Such rules should have no effect on the choices of contracting 
parties - who will rely on efficient defaults and contract around inefficient ones - in 
the absence of transaction costs, externalities, orinformation asymmetries.2 After 
* The ideas presented here have benefited from discussions with Ehud Guttel, Jef- 
frey Rachlinski, and Anne van Aaken. My work on this comment has enjoyed the hos- 
pitality and support of the Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business at Harvard 
Law School. 
1 Given space constraints, his comment discusses only some of the intriguing SOS 
results. 
A typical recent statement ofthis traditional l w and economics view is Posner 
[2003, p. 98]. 
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 
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controlling for the latter variables, SOS were not expected to observe default contract 
stickiness. At the same time, however, the No Bias Finding seems to contradict an 
extensive body of empirical evidence suggesting that default rules may well be 
sticky beyond the predictions of rational choice models. 
In one of only two earlier specific experimental tests of contractual defaults, 
Korobkin [1998] used three contract negotiation scenarios. Participants were told 
they represented a company and responded to measures of their preference for the 
particular contract term at stake. The results howed a consistent bias in favor of the 
status quo default erm; labeling a given term the default significantly strengthened 
participants' preference for that erm. These results are in accord with an extensive 
experimental literature onthe impact of defaults, the status quo, and reference points 
more generally on preferences (e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler [1990]; 
Kahneman and Tversky [1979]; Samuelson and Zeckhauser [1988]; but 
see Plott and Zeiler [2005]),3 which is further corroborated by a diverse body 
of field evidence (Camerer [2000]).4 
It is possible that contract default rules, whose relevance is contingent upon par- 
ties' agreement to contract, differ from other default states. Parties therefore might 
not perceive contingent contractual defaults as relevant reference points (Korobkin 
[1998]; Schwab [1988]). Ironically, however, the SOS "default contract" applied 
inevitably whenever proposed and whenever Respondents rejected a non-default 
proposal, bearing reater resemblance to a legal right than to a contractual default. 
Thus, the contingency of typical contractual defaults cannot account for the No Bias 
Finding. 
Other aspects of the SOS experimental design, on the other hand, may explain the 
No Bias Finding. Specifically, the SOS participants chose among monetary gambles 
under isk (with no uncertainty), with the defaults comprising explicit risky gambles 
as well and providing no fixed reference points. Participants also faced only expected 
total gains. And, finally, the gambles were color-coded "contracts," devoid of the 
very institutional and legal context hat define a real-world contract, remedy, or 
default rule. 
These characteristics largely reflect a laudable adherence to experimental eco- 
nomics conventions, including the provision of monetary incentives for perform- 
ance; the measurement ofbehavior ather than verbal responses; and the abstract 
description of experimental settings (Camerer and Talley [2005]). The same 
design characteristics, however, also generated a context in which the very phe- 
3 Additional related phenomena include omission bias, regret and decision avoid- 
ance, inertia and more. 4 There is also specific anecdotal evidence of parties' reluctance tocontract around 
legal defaults that appears largely inexplicable from a rational choice perspective. 
Donohue [1991] noted that litigants do not contract around the legal rule concerning 
the allocation of litigation costs, even where beneficial. Farnsworth [1999] exam- 
ined a random set of 20 nuisance cases after judgment, finding no bargaining; the par- 
ties' lawyers also did not believe there would have been bargaining if the results were 
reversed. 
This content downloaded from 129.74.250.206 on Fri, 1 Nov 2013 09:21:49 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
28 Avishalom Tor JITE 163 
nomenon SOS sought to test was unlikely to manifest i self: Neither endowment 
nor loss aversion typically occur for money (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 
[1990]); loss aversion also requires uncertainty about the benefits of the tradeoff 
between alternative states (Novemsky and Kahneman [2005]);5 those reference 
points that generate loss aversion or a status quo bias, moreover, are typically certain 
(or at least appear so to decision makers) rather than comprising explicit monetary 
gambles; and, finally, loss aversion would be unlikely to appear in choices among 
potential gains. 
An adoption of the default contract as a reference point - and the resulting 
perception of a potential loss on the part of participants - still might have been 
achieved in a richer, more realistic, institutional orlegal context, resembling that of 
Korobkin [1998], but such a context was intentionally avoided. Given the totality 
of the SOS experimental design, therefore, results showing the default contract to 
impact participants' choices would have been dramatic indeed. The present No Bias 
Finding, on the other hand, accords with the findings of the broader behavioral 
literature and the rational choice prediction alike. 
The methodological conventions of experimental economics can contribute o 
legal analysis. When studying repetitive behavior in markets, for instance, the use 
of multiple trials and the provision of monetary performance incentives will often 
be appropriate.6 When studying legal behavior, however, one must ake care not to 
abstract from those aspects of the legal context hat shape and define this behavior 
in the real world (see Rachlinski [2000]). Such a careful approach would not limit 
ELE, but rather make it a more valid, versatile, and effective tool for legal analysis. 
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